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In his speech to the 2012 Labour Party conference, Ed Miliband appropriated Benjamin 
Disraeli’s idea of ‘One Nation’ to convey his vision of a united Britain. This address was 
delivered against the backdrop of rising unemployment, higher public borrowing and the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat government’s ongoing austerity programme (Miliband, 
2012). Six months later, on 1 April 2013, the Coalition’s welfare reforms came into effect, 
accompanied by a storm of controversy and an increasingly punitive public discourse. While 
these changes were popular with some sections of the electorate, others raised concerns over 
the unfairness of certain measures – notably the removal of the spare room subsidy from 
Housing Benefit recipients of working age, a policy its critics have dubbed the ‘bedroom tax’ 
– and the demonisation of benefit claimants by the tabloid press. Nevertheless, both sides 
acknowledged that the welfare state was in need of reform.   
  
Having specified the broad ‘rhetorical context’ (Martin, 2013, pp. 10-11) that gave rise to 
One Nation Labour and its emergent policy programme, this article will first situate its 
analysis within existing scholarship on British political speech and ideological renewal. Next, 
it utilises Michael Freeden’s morphological approach to map and interpret the core concepts 
of Labour’s ideology, before identifying the ‘commonplace’ arguments and rhetorical proofs 
with which this standpoint provides its adherents. Among these arguments are the narratives 
of party traditions, ‘new times’ and national renewal, and the article examines their role in 
making the case for One Nation social security reform. In so doing, it locates the three 
narratives within the ideological and rhetorical traditions of British social democracy, and 
demonstrates that they coalesce in the leadership persona of Ed Miliband. Though an attempt 
to respond to a populist ‘rhetorical culture’ (see Atkins and Finlayson, 2013), the article 
contends that this adaptation of the Labour narratives to the ‘personalised political’ (Gaffney 
and Lahel, 2013a, p. 487) has given rise to a solipsistic ideology that is unable to conceive of 
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an audience beyond itself. Labour must, therefore, imagine a wider audience, and adapt its 
rhetorical strategies accordingly, if it is to achieve its goal of a return to power in 2015.              
 
Rhetoric and ideology in British politics  
 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in British political speech across a range of 
disciplines. Within Linguistics, for example, scholars have employed Critical Discourse 
Analysis to illuminate areas including parliamentary speech and the political interview 
(Chilton, 2004), the language of New Labour (Fairclough, 2000), and the use of metaphor by 
such figures as Enoch Powell, Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair (Charteris-Black, 2012). 
These studies have undoubtedly yielded valuable insights into the language of British politics 
but all under-theorise its relationship to ideology, either reducing it to a discourse or ignoring 
it altogether (Atkins, 2011, p. 6). If we accept that ideology remains an important part of 
political activity, this is a serious oversight that renders these accounts incomplete.          
 
This omission is particularly problematic for the study of political speech in Britain since 
2010. While many hold that the New Labour era was characterised by party convergence (see 
Hindmoor, 2005, p. 403), the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition has brought this 
period of ‘consensus’ to an abrupt end, and indeed is proving to be ‘as ideologically radical 
as [the governments] of Thatcher and Attlee’ (Jacobs, 2013a). Consequently, an appreciation 
of the role of ideology is arguably more important than ever. One approach that connects 
analyses of political speech with the study of ideologies is Rhetorical Political Analysis 
(Finlayson, 2004; Finlayson, 2007). This approach takes as its starting-point the Aristotelian 
categories of ethos (appeals based on the character of the speaker), pathos (appeals to the 
emotions of an audience) and logos (appeals to reason) but – crucially – perceives these three 
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forms of proof within specific ‘argumentative contexts’. As Alan Finlayson explains, the 
shape of these contexts ‘is in part defined by the historical development and deployment of 
these arguments which, if they are to survive, must win adherents in a contest of persuasive 
presentation’ (2007, p. 559). That ideas are a vital component of any argumentative context is 
recognised by the existing scholarship on British political rhetoric (e.g. Atkins, 2010; Atkins, 
2011; Atkins and Finlayson, 2013; Crines, 2013; Finlayson, 2012; Finlayson and Martin, 
2008), to which this article seeks to contribute.   
 
The article makes a further contribution to the small but expanding literature on the post-2010 
Labour Party, which has so far focused on Miliband’s leadership persona (Gaffney and Lahel, 
2013a), the roots of One Nation (Jackson, 2012; Gaffney and Lahel, 2013b; Jacobs, 2013b; 
Wickham-Jones, 2013; Wood, 2013) and Labour’s evolving social security policy (Bale, 
2013). However, the morphology of Labour’s post-2010 ideological platform remains 
unexamined, as do the narratives mobilised by leading Party figures to make the case for 
reform. By locating these narratives within the rhetorical and ideological traditions of British 
social democracy, the article provides a novel perspective on party renewal that complements 
the extant research on Labour Party modernisation (e.g. Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009; 
Diamond, 2004; Dommett, 2014; Jones, 1996).  
 
The ideology of the Miliband Labour Party 
 
According to Mark Wickham-Jones, One Nation offers ‘a potential narrative about Labour’s 
identity, one that might be contrasted with the pragmatism (and the emphases on particular 
isolated policy measures) that had dominated [New] Labour’s time in office between 1997 
and 2010’ (2013, p. 322). Moreover, with its emphasis on unity over sectionalism, One 
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Nation distinguishes the party from both ‘Old’ Labour and the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition. These differentiation strategies are evident in Miliband’s statement that 
Labour ‘must be the party of the private sector just as much as the party of the public sector’ 
(2012) and Ed Balls’s promise that One Nation economic policy will work ‘for the many and 
not just a few at the top’ (2013) respectively. As we will see below, the Miliband Labour 
Party not only contrasts these three opposing perspectives, but transcends them by 
formulating a fourth standpoint that incorporates a number of elements from, and yet goes 
beyond, the original positions (adapted from McAnulla, 2010, p. 292). We can perhaps refer 
to this technique as ‘rectangulation’.   
 
Freeden’s morphological approach affords a useful means of mapping and interpreting the 
constituent concepts of Labour’s ideology. On this view, ideologies are conceptual 
configurations, or ‘morphologies’, which consist of a core cluster, a number of adjacent 
concepts, and a periphery composed of ideas that are insignificant relative to the core. 
Freeden divides the peripheral elements of an ideology into two types. The first of these is the 
margin, which comprises concepts that are of little emotional and intellectual significance. 
Second is the perimeter, which consists of policy proposals and ideas and links the 
constituent concepts of an ideology to the social world (Freeden, 1998, pp. 77-9). Each of 
these concepts is rotated through ‘a range of meanings until one of those meanings is held 
vis-à-vis the similarly held, or decontested, meanings of every other concept’ (Freeden, 1998, 
p. 83), and a coherent ideological platform is generated.    
 
The core concepts of Labour’s ideology can be identified as social justice, inclusion, 
cohesion and mutual responsibility. Social justice is decontested as a commitment to tackle 
inequality, to ‘build a country whose productivity, prosperity and common life are based on 
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“the many, not the few”’ (Wood, 2013, p. 317). As Miliband puts it, One Nation ‘is about 
everybody having opportunity’ (2013a); it is ‘a country where prosperity is fairly shared’ 
(2012). Additionally, Labour is committed to the devolution of power to the local level, 
which is intended to promote inclusion by ensuring that every citizen ‘feels able to play their 
part, not left on their own’ (Miliband, 2013b). This rejection of the statism associated with 
‘Old’ Labour echoes Tony Blair’s assertion that New Labour would ‘give power back to the 
people, and in return we expect them to take on greater responsibility for themselves’ (1996, 
p. 262). It also informs David Cameron’s idea of the ‘Big Society’, which seeks to promote 
inclusion by encouraging social responsibility (Cameron, 2006). For Miliband, however, this 
goal is to be achieved primarily by combating inequalities of power and opportunity. As such, 
inclusion and social justice are closely linked to their adjacent concept of localism.     
 
In accordance with the traditional social democratic commitment to co-operative action, the 
concept of cohesion is decontested as a belief in the importance of a common life. In 
Miliband’s words, One Nation is a country where ‘we have a shared destiny, a sense of 
shared endeavour and a common life that we lead together’. However, he continues, One 
Nation can be realised only if people across society accept the responsibilities they owe to 
each other (2012). This represents a departure from the New Labour era, in which 
government was ‘too silent about the responsibilities of those at the top’ and, moreover, 
subordinated our civic duties to the rights of individuals (Miliband, 2012; Atkins, 2011, pp. 
181-3). It also differentiates Labour from the Conservative-led coalition which, Miliband 
claims, ‘preaches responsibility. But do nothing to make it possible for people to play their 
part … They talk about a “big society”. But then it makes life harder for our charities, our 
community groups’ (2013b). In contrast, Labour will ensure that everyone – from the richest 
in society to those on social security benefits – fulfils their obligations and so plays their part 
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in rebuilding Britain as One Nation (Miliband, 2013b); the concepts of cohesion and 
responsibility are mutually dependent.                            
 
Having mapped the core cluster of Labour’s ideology, the question arises of how these 
commitments relate to the rhetoric of One Nation. As noted above, Freeden holds that the 
perimeter acts as an interface between the constituent concepts of an ideology and the social 
world. This enables the ideology to incorporate and respond to social change, and so plays a 
vital role in conceptual decontestation (Freeden, 1998, pp. 76-80). More than this, however, 
Finlayson argues that ideological activity at the perimeter involves ‘making political claims, 
proving judgements and staging interventions in ways that might persuade others to assent to 
them’. In other words, an ideology is not simply a system of ideas that shapes political 
thinking, but a means for actors to ‘express and embody their political thinking and 
communicate it to others’ (2012, pp. 757-8). To understand this function of ideology, we 
need to enter the realm of rhetoric and argumentation.           
 
On Finlayson’s view, ideologies ‘provide actors with a series of locally established 
“commonplace” arguments, which must be adapted to the demands of the situation’. More 
specifically, they supply both substantive arguments and a set of criteria for evaluating 
whether an argument is good or bad, whether it constitutes an appropriate or inappropriate 
means of persuasion (2012, p. 759). As we will see in the remainder of the article, One 
Nation has its roots in the modernising traditions of social democracy and, moreover, it builds 
on the discourses articulated by the British Labour Party in recent decades (Wickham-Jones, 
2013, p. 327). Among these ‘commonplace’ arguments are the narratives of party traditions, 
‘new times’ and national renewal, all of which have been deployed by previous Labour 
leaders to make the case for their modernised standpoint. 
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Ideological arguments also draw on the Aristotelian proofs of logos, pathos and ethos, though 
the arrangement of these appeals and the degree of emphasis assigned to them will vary 
between ideologies (Finlayson, 2012, p. 759). While it is clear from the previous discussion 
that the definitions of concepts are of vital importance to ideological configurations, so too is 
their ‘capacity to induce chains of quasi-logical reasoning’. This aspect of logos is known as 
the enthymeme, whereby a speaker describes a situation and incites their listeners to 
understand it in this way rather than in another (Finlayson, 2012, p. 762), and it plays a 
central role in the narrative of ‘new times’. Furthermore, an ideology has an emotional tenor 
(Finlayson, 2012, p. 761), which derives primarily from the decontested meanings of its 
constituent concepts and forms the basis of appeals to pathos. As elaborated below, the mood 
of One Nation Labour is one of optimism and a shared destiny and, in their efforts to secure 
the assent of their listeners, party figures draw on their ideological commitments to construct 
an inspiring vision of a united Britain. Finally, contemporary political leaders are required to 
demonstrate their ethos and cultivate a leadership persona, which may embody the 
ideological commitments of their party. This is an important function of the ‘personal-
political’ narrative of Miliband’s leadership (Gaffney and Lahel, 2013a, p. 495), to which we 
return in due course.  
 
The argument from ethos is also about the ‘creation of community through forms of 
identification’. Here, a speaker attempts to persuade an audience that they share his or her 
interests, and thus establish rapport between them (Finlayson, 2012, p. 760; see also Burke, 
1969, p. 46). This type of identification is evident in appeals to party traditions, whereby a 
leader seeks to demonstrate that their values accord with those of the movement they 
represent. However, as Finlayson correctly points out, ‘“the audience” is not a unitary or 
stable referent and is always in some measure a fictive creation around which rhetorical 
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invention is built’. That is, a speaker first imagines an audience and then presents their 
ideological claims in terms that are congruent with the common sense of that audience. These 
specifications of the target audience – which may include such constructions as the ‘squeezed 
middle’, ‘hardworking families’ and the ‘silent majority’ – are an integral part of an ideology 
(2012, p. 763) and, in attending to them, we can shed light on why some rhetorical 
performances connect with an audience whereas others do not.  
 
Taking these insights into morphology and ideological argument as its starting-point, the 
article will now examine the narratives mobilised by leading Labour figures to make the case 
for One Nation social security. They are: party traditions; ‘new times’; national renewal; and 
the ‘personal-political’ narrative of Miliband’s leadership, and I consider them in turn.          
 
Party traditions 
 
In arguing for One Nation social security reform, Labour figures locate their agenda within 
their party’s ideological traditions. Although not unique to Labour, this rhetorical strategy 
comes to the fore during periods of renewal, when a party is required ‘simultaneously to 
appeal to the past and to break with it. These two requirements need not only to be balanced 
but to be integrated through an appropriate rhetorical invocation of an ideological narrative’ 
(Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009, p. 14). To fulfil the first requirement, a political actor may 
make references to luminaries from the party’s past, and thus establish identification between 
their ethos and that of the movement they represent. Then, after showing due deference to the 
past, a party leader can ‘seek to reinvent that tradition so that their leadership becomes its 
self-evident culmination’ (Atkins and Finlayson, forthcoming).    
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A typical example is present in Miliband’s case for the application of Labour’s core concept 
of mutual responsibility to the welfare state. Here he invokes one of the key architects of this 
scheme who, though a Liberal, is held in high regard by many social democrats: ‘As William 
Beveridge envisaged seventy years ago when he founded the social security system we need 
to understand that there are three sets of people with responsibilities: Government. 
Individuals. And the private sector, including employers’ (2013a). Similarly, Liam Byrne 
drew on party traditions to demonstrate that the One Nation social security agenda – based as 
it is on a belief in the dignity of work – is consistent with Labour’s fundamental values: 
The story of our fight for jobs is the genesis of our credo. When Keir Hardie stood up 
in Parliament as the first Labour MP, he spoke to insist on the principle of work or 
maintenance. ‘Useful work for the unemployed’ was the call of our first 
manifesto. And it is our call today (2013a).  
Here, Miliband and Byrne seek to locate their approach firmly within Labour’s traditions, 
reaffirm their commitment to its core principles, and cultivate ethos by allying themselves 
with pioneering figures from its past. Taken together, these appeals to tradition are designed 
to reassure supporters that the One Nation social security agenda is in harmony with the 
party’s ideological heritage, and that modernisation will not come at the cost of Labour’s 
soul. 
 
The same justificatory strategy was deployed by Blair to present himself as the successor to 
Clement Attlee and Harold Wilson, while positioning the New Labour project as the logical 
next step in an ongoing process of party renewal:       
1945 was new Labour, 1964 was new Labour – both new Labour because both had 
the courage to take the values of the Labour Party and use them, not for the world as it 
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was, but for the world as they wanted it to be. New Labour now is ready in 1995 to 
build new Britain (1995). 
Two years later, Gordon Brown would claim that ‘it is because like generations before us we 
are applying great ideals, Labour’s enduring values, to new circumstances and new 
challenges that we can genuinely say we are modernisers’, before recalling the achievements 
of Keir Hardie and Aneurin Bevan (1997). By emphasising these key moments in Labour’s 
history, Blair and Brown assumed the mantle of modernisation from their predecessors, and 
so sought to enhance the legitimacy of the New Labour project in the eyes of the party 
faithful. Although such references may have limited appeal for the wider public, it is worth 
noting that ‘a party seen more broadly to have become divided or to have lost the confidence 
of a significant part of its membership is likely to be regarded with suspicion by the 
electorate’. The affirmation of ideological identity is, therefore, central to the process of party 
renewal (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009, pp. 13-14), and ultimately to the quest for hegemonic 
advantage.  
 
‘New times’ and modernisation  
 
Whereas the above narrative emphasises One Nation Labour’s fidelity to party traditions, a 
second stresses the necessity of breaking with its past. Here, Labour figures employ logos to 
characterise the present as ‘new times’, so that ‘what will be is shown logically to follow’ 
(Finlayson, 2012, p. 762). This is achieved by means of two periodisations, the first of which 
is ideological and proceeds from the assumption that the certainties of the New Labour era 
were swept away by the global financial crisis of 2008. Miliband explains that:  
There was an old way of running the economy that saw financial services as the 
bedrock of our prosperity … In the way we live together in communities, there was an 
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old certainty that globalisation and economic change would open up aspiration and 
benefit all … None of these certainties any longer hold (2013c). 
As we will see below, this is an example of strategising which, in James Martin’s words, 
entails ‘formulating interpretations of a situation such that audiences are moved to respond in 
certain ways rather than others’ (2013, p. 6).  
   
According to Miliband, ‘One Nation Labour learns the lessons of the financial crisis … [and] 
adapts to new times’. Although it recognises the achievements of the Blair-Brown 
governments – notably the National Minimum Wage, the introduction of tax credits and 
increased investment in public services – it understands that New Labour was too cautious in 
its economic reforms, that it ‘did not do enough to change the balance of power in this 
country’, and that it neglected the responsibilities of those at the top of society. To rectify 
these mistakes, Miliband continues, One Nation Labour will reshape the economy to create 
shared prosperity, devolve more power and resources to the local level, and ensure that all 
sections of society fulfil their obligations (2013b). In so doing, it will be bolder than its 
predecessor in its efforts to realise Labour’s commitments to social justice, mutual 
responsibility and cohesion. Thus, by portraying New Labour’s approach as ill-suited to ‘new 
times’ and the project itself as only a partial success, Miliband is able to frame party renewal 
as the only viable alternative while laying the foundations of the One Nation agenda.          
 
The second periodisation is socio-economic and uses logos to detail the changes that Britain 
has experienced since the inception of the welfare state. As Byrne puts it, ‘full employment 
has gone. The job for life has gone. Industry is radically restructured. The labour market is all 
different … Female employment has risen by over 50 per cent since 1971’. Consequently, 
Labour must ‘renew [social security] for the 21st century and not freeze it in the past’ (2012; 
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see also Miliband, 2013a). To meet these challenges, the next Labour government will help 
people into employment through the Compulsory Jobs Guarantee, the Basic Skills Test and 
increased childcare provision; make work pay by enforcing the Minimum Wage and 
promoting the Living Wage; and recognise the contribution of those who have paid into the 
system. These initiatives reflect the close connection between social justice and inclusion in 
Labour’s ideology, and so will ensure that ‘all do have the opportunity to play their part [in 
building One Nation], not just a few’ (Miliband, 2013b). In short, Labour will ‘keep the 
theory, and update the practice’ (Byrne, 2012). Implicit in this commitment to find new 
means of realising the Party’s traditional goals is an acknowledgement that ‘Old’ Labour’s 
approach is inappropriate to these ‘new times’; a return to past policies is not an option.  
      
This idea of ‘new times’ was also invoked by Blair and Wilson in their arguments for 
ideological renewal. For the architects of New Labour, the social and economic changes 
wrought by globalisation represented a significant challenge both to Britain and to the party’s 
ideological tradition. To address it they advocated the ‘Third Way’, which stood for a 
‘modernised social democracy, passionate in its commitment to … the goals of the centre-
left, but flexible, innovative and forward-looking in the means to achieve them’ (Blair, 1998, 
p. 1). Likewise, Wilson depicted the early 1960s as ‘a time of … rapid scientific change’, in 
response to which ‘we are redefining and we are restating our Socialism’ (1963). These 
logos-based constructions of the present as a period of upheaval serve to justify ideological 
revisionism, which in turn lays the foundations for a Labour government to enact its 
programme of national renewal.       
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One Nation and national renewal  
 
By emphasising its continuity with, and departure from, party traditions, the previous two 
narratives position One Nation Labour relative to both ‘Old’ and New Labour. A third 
narrative completes the rectangulation process by distinguishing the One Nation approach 
from that of the Conservative-led coalition government. Here, Labour figures present the 
party’s renewed standpoint as ‘suitable to rectifying the mistakes of those whose recent 
hegemonic dominance it is seeking to challenge’ (Buckler and Dolowitz, 2009, p. 15). To this 
end, they employ pathos and the rhetorical technique of antithesis to contrast the alleged 
failures of the Coalition with the One Nation agenda, and thereby assert the superiority of 
Labour’s response to the challenges posed by ‘new times’.   
 
On Miliband’s view, the Coalition stands for ‘a privileged few at the top. We know that they 
will never create an economy that works for working people. It is not what they believe’ 
(2013d). Here, he calls attention to the divide between the wealthy and the rest of society – 
the ‘two nations’ in Disraelian terms – and uses pathos to induce a sense of injustice in his 
audience. Rachel Reeves’s attack on the Conservatives’ ‘complacency’ about rising 
unemployment is consistent with Miliband’s critique, as is the emotive claim that long term 
worklessness has a ‘devastating effect on people’s employment prospects and earnings 
through the rest of their lives’. Unemployment also has significant economic costs, she 
continues, given that ‘over five years the government is spending £1.4 billion more on 
Jobseeker’s Allowance than they originally budgeted for’ (2014). This violates the 
Coalition’s pledge to drastically reduce public spending and, for Labour, provides proof that 
its policies are fundamentally flawed.    
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In contrast, Labour’s programme is founded on the belief that Britain is at its best when it 
challenges separation and exclusion (Wood, 2013, p. 317). As Byrne puts it: 
They offer us the politics of division when we need the politics of unity, the politics 
of One Nation, to pull our country through. Ambition. Compassion. Dignity. Duty. 
We use these words as the foundations for a country we love. They use them as a 
punchline. And that’s why we need to win government in 2015 (2012).   
These principles are manifested in Labour’s One Nation plan for social security which, 
Reeves argues, will create a system that ‘meets genuine need and rewards responsibility, 
while keeping costs under control over the long term’ and ensuring that work always pays 
(2014). Moreover, with its emphasis on unity and inclusion, the One Nation agenda aims to 
disrupt the Conservatives’ efforts to pit one section of society against another, as exemplified 
by the crude antithesis of ‘strivers vs. skivers’ (see Hayton and McEnhill, 2014). One Nation 
thus approximates a ‘projectile’ that is intended to ‘shift the terms of debate’ (Martin, 2013, 
p. 4), and so wrest hegemonic advantage from Labour’s opponents.      
 
As we have seen, the idea of One Nation is appropriated from Disraeli, whose conservatism 
emphasised social responsibility and offered ‘a vision of Britain coming together to overcome 
the challenges we faced’ (Miliband, 2012). From this starting-point Miliband constructs a 
narrative of One Nation, into which he interpolates the post-war Labour governments in a bid 
to appeal to his party’s supporters:    
We heard the phrase again as the country came together to defeat fascism. And we 
heard it again as Clement Attlee’s Labour government rebuilt Britain after the war ... 
We built the peace because Labour governments and Conservative governments 
understood we needed to be One Nation. Every time Britain has faced its gravest 
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challenge, we have only come through the storm because we were One Nation. But 
too often governments have forgotten that lesson (2012).  
Crucially, One Nation ‘doesn’t just tell us the country we can be. It tells us how we must 
rebuild’ (Miliband, 2012). This representation of One Nation as a tried and tested means for 
overcoming the uncertainties of ‘new times’ is designed to confer credibility on Labour’s 
proposals for social security reform which, as part of its wider policy programme, are 
intended to realise the Party’s vision of a united Britain. It also challenges the Conservative-
led coalition to demonstrate that it can govern for the whole of the nation, and not merely for 
the wealthy few.  
 
The emotional tenor of One Nation Labour is of common endeavor and a shared destiny. This 
evident in Miliband’s account of One Nation as: 
The idea of a country which we rebuild together, where everyone plays their part … 
We know this idea is a deep part of our national story because we have so many 
different ways of describing it. “All hands to the pump.” “Mucking in.” “Pulling your 
weight.” “Doing your bit.” And every day we see it at work in our country (2013b). 
By expressing Labour’s longstanding commitment to co-operative action in everyday terms, 
Miliband may be attempting to bridge the gap between the topoi (commonplaces) of his 
ideological tradition and the doxa (opinions and beliefs) of a wider, non-Party audience (see 
Finlayson, 2012, pp. 762-3). His language is also ‘reminiscent of a kind of rallying war-time 
spirit’ (Gaffney and Lahel, 2013b, p. 336), which in turn establishes a link between the 
devastation of post-war Britain and the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis – both of 
which, Labour claims, demand a collective response that only it can provide. 
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In elaborating his vision of Britain as One Nation, Miliband brings together his party’s core 
values of inclusion, social justice and cohesion with an appeal to pathos:   
Friends, I didn’t become leader of the Labour Party to reinvent the world of Disraeli 
or Attlee. But I do believe in that spirit. That spirit of One Nation. One Nation: a 
country where everyone has a stake. One Nation: a country where prosperity is fairly 
shared. One Nation: where we have a shared destiny, a sense of shared endeavour and 
a common life that we lead together. That is my vision of One Nation. That is my 
vision of Britain. That is the Britain we must become (2012). 
Here, Miliband again uses colloquial language to communicate Labour’s ideological 
commitments to a wider audience, heightening the emotional impact of his words through 
repetition. He thus seeks to win the assent of his listeners by inspiring them with the prospect 
of a better future for Britain, one that is starkly juxtaposed with the divided society he claims 
the Coalition’s policies have created. 
 
It is worth calling attention to the contrast between Miliband’s optimism and the 
Conservatives’ pessimistic vision of permanent austerity (see Cameron, 2013). In this, he 
draws on the utopian strand within British social democracy, which is given expression by 
previous Labour leaders in the idea of ‘new Britain’. For instance, Wilson promised in 1966 
that his government would ‘build a new Britain … [to meet] the challenge of our times’ 
while, as Leaders of the Opposition, John Smith envisaged ‘the new Britain that Labour 
wants to build’ as ‘a country where strong communities help each one of us to live a fulfilling 
life’ (1993) and Blair offered his ‘vision of a new Britain – a nation reborn, prosperous, 
secure, united – one Britain’ (1995). These characterisations of ‘new Britain’ bear a striking 
resemblance to ‘One Nation’, and indeed all afford Labour leaders an effective means of 
17 
 
opposing their commitment to act for the whole country to the ‘sectional’ approach taken by 
the Conservatives.        
 
Ed Miliband and the ‘personalised political’ 
 
At the perimeter of an ideology, actors seek to ‘embody their causes and perform their 
politics. A political style takes on the form of a proof that can be identified as a definitive 
aspect of a form of political thinking’ (Finlayson, 2012, p. 760). Such appeals to the character 
of the speaker (ethos) are not, of course, unique to Labour leaders, but an examination of 
Miliband’s rhetoric reveals that he positions himself as the defender of the public good 
against such vested interests as the ‘big six’ energy companies and the Murdoch media 
empire (e.g. Miliband, 2012; Miliband, 2013b; Miliband, 2013c). In so doing, writes Ben 
Jackson, Miliband becomes the latest in a succession of ‘reforming leaders of the left … [to 
couch] their appeal in populist and patriotic terms, seeking to mobilise low- and middle-
income citizens against powerful elites’ (2012, p. 160).       
 
This populist strategy is equally evident in Miliband’s claim that One Nation social security 
‘reflects the values of the British people’ (2013a; see also Miliband, 2013b), where he 
constructs the public as an ‘imagined community’ that shares Labour’s beliefs (see Gaffney 
and Lahel, 2013a, p. 484). While there is a long tradition of populism in British political 
speech, the party leaders of today must also demonstrate that they understand ‘ordinary 
people’. To this end, Miliband frequently relates anecdotes about his encounters with them, 
of which the following is a typical example:          
I think of the young man I met in Long Eaton recently, out of work for four years, 
desperate for a job. The problem is this government’s Work Programme can leave 
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people like him unemployed year after year after year. We would put a limit on how 
long anyone who can work, can stay unemployed, without getting and taking a job 
(2013a). 
Here, Miliband highlights a flaw in the Coalition’s approach and derives a policy conclusion 
from this diagnosis (Atkins and Finlayson, 2013, p. 170). By linking the problem to the 
everyday experience of an ‘ordinary’ citizen, he may be seeking to adapt to the demands of 
populist rhetorical culture, while enhancing his ethos as a leader who is ‘in touch’ with – and 
so is fit to represent – the people of Britain.  
 
It is important to note that Miliband articulates ‘One Nation’ in terms of his personal 
experiences and beliefs (Gaffney and Lahel, 2013b, pp. 335-6; Dommett, 2014). As he told 
his party conference in 2012: ‘In One Nation, in my faith, inequality matters. It matters to our 
country’ (2012). In other words, Labour values are not simply the values of the British 
people; they are the values of Miliband himself. For John Gaffney and Amarjit Lahel, this is 
an example of the ‘personalised political’, which involves ‘bringing the self in some way into 
responses to wider issues’ (2013a, p. 487) and thus affords the speaker a populist means of 
inviting identification. More than this, however, Miliband’s leadership ‘character’ supplies a 
point of coalescence for the narratives of party traditions, ‘new times’ and national renewal 
that we considered above.   
  
By aligning himself with historical party figures, Miliband offers himself as the present 
embodiment of Labour’s traditions. Although he acknowledges the achievements of New 
Labour, which ‘pioneered the idea of rights and responsibilities’, Miliband rejects as ill-suited 
to ‘new times’ those aspects of its approach – notably the disregard for the duties of those at 
the top of society – that are contrary to his own principles. Meanwhile, ‘Old’ Labour’s way is 
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discarded due to its neglect of rights and responsibilities per se, which again runs counter to 
Miliband’s values (2013b) though he endorses its commitment to collective endeavour. In 
this way, Miliband is positioned both within and in opposition to aspects of his party’s 
ideological heritage by virtue of his personal beliefs. Similarly, Miliband’s convictions 
provide a basis from which to criticise the ‘unfair’ policies of his opponents. This is evident 
in his assertion that: ‘I will tell you that we need to protect the dignity of work and make 
work pay. He [Cameron] will hit the low-paid in work’ (2013a). The three narratives thus 
converge within the leadership persona of Ed Miliband, creating a rhetoric that is ‘self-
referential and “about him”, [and which] informs the way “he” talks about issues, policies 
and events’ (Gaffney and Lahel, 2013a, p. 499). 
 
Evaluating One Nation Labour 
 
The narratives of party traditions, ‘new times’ and national renewal proved highly effective 
for past Labour leaders, notably Blair and Wilson. This raises the question of why Miliband’s 
One Nation agenda has so far failed to gain traction with the electorate. A possible 
explanation is that although the appropriation of this idea from the Conservatives was 
undoubtedly an audacious move, the Party’s ‘willingness to wrap every possible idea in 
which [it] is currently interested under the One Nation blanket – from environmentalism to 
gender equality, from opposing Scottish devolution to housing policy – has a deadening 
effect on ideological clarity’ (Jacobs, 2013b, p. 315). In turn, there is a danger that such 
relentless sloganeering will alienate listeners, as ‘simply repeating a key message or phrase 
[no longer] has the same resonance with electors that it once had’ (Danczuk, 2014a).    
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A further difficulty is that the ‘new times’ narrative fails to create sufficient distance between 
One Nation Labour and its immediate predecessor, due to the presence of several former New 
Labour ministers in the Shadow Cabinet. That Miliband is among their number also weakens 
the credibility of his leadership narrative, on the ground that the previous government is still 
widely blamed for causing the crisis that ushered in these ‘new times’. Similarly, Labour’s 
capitulation to Coalition policies such as the benefits cap and the abolition of universal child 
benefit (Miliband, 2013a) threatens the integrity of the One Nation narrative and, by 
implication, of Miliband’s leadership character. At the same time, as Gaffney and Lahel 
observe, ‘One Nation became vulnerable through personal attacks upon or undermining of 
[Miliband’s] persona’ (2013b, p. 339). In short, the two narratives stand or fall together.  
 
While Miliband’s adaptation of the three ‘commonplace’ Labour narratives to the 
‘personalised political’ may appeal to the party faithful, the electorate remain unconvinced by 
his ethos-driven rhetoric (see Crines, forthcoming, pp. 187, 190). Indeed, the Labour MP 
Simon Danczuk argues that the Party has ‘become too comfortable with talking to ourselves, 
with policy announced through set-piece speeches as though in a university lecture’ (2014b). 
Such addresses are characterised by the epideictic genre of rhetoric, whereby audience 
members are assigned the role of spectators who are there to ‘experience the affirmation of 
values’ (Finlayson, 2012, p. 763). However, this type of rhetoric serves only to reinforce the 
existing identification between the Labour leadership and party supporters, and so is unlikely 
to persuade a sceptical public to think of itself as belonging to that community. To address 
this, Labour needs to rely less on appeals to its own values and traditions (as embodied in 
Miliband’s leadership persona), and instead conceive of an audience beyond the Party, 
imagine its common sense, and adapt its rhetoric accordingly. Many of Labour’s policy 
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proposals are proving popular with the public (Toynbee, 2014); the challenge is to 
communicate them in a way that resonates with this wider audience. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this article has examined the core concepts of Labour’s ideology and the 
substantive arguments at its perimeter. The analysis reveals that One Nation Labour 
articulates its values of social justice, inclusion, mutual responsibility and cohesion within 
three ‘commonplace’ narratives of British social democracy to carve out a distinctive position 
and make the case for social security reform. Like Blair and Wilson before them, leading 
Party figures employ logos to characterise the present as ‘new times’, a portrayal designed to 
justify ideological revisionism and lay the foundations for national renewal. The ultimate 
objective of this programme is to rebuild Britain as One Nation and, through pathos, Labour 
seeks to inspire its listeners with the promise of a better future, and so secure their assent.  
 
It is the appeal to ethos that predominates within the ideology of One Nation Labour. In 
common with his predecessors, Miliband seeks to locate himself within his party’s traditions 
and to offer himself as the present embodiment of its values. However, he must also respond 
to an increasingly populist rhetorical culture, and to this end he adapts the three Labour 
narratives to the ‘personalised political’. Paradoxically, this strategy has created a solipsistic 
rhetoric that has so far failed to connect with the public; Labour’s ideology is self-enclosed 
and cannot conceive of an audience beyond itself. The problems with this approach are 
obvious, and the Miliband Labour Party must imagine a wider audience, and adapt its 
rhetorical strategies accordingly, if it is to secure victory in 2015. 
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